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Foreword
There are two basic ways to increase the capacity of a water supply 
system: store more water to use in dry years, but not in others, and, learn
to use less water in dry years. Both are costly in terms of what society 
must give up and both are demanding of public decision-making capacity.
There is no free water at lunch or any other time.
The cheap dam sites have dams in them, or are ful1 of other things.
Dams have become a symbol of the impact of human activity on the other 
elements of the biological system. If the dedication of opponents is any 
measure, the psychic costs of dams may be their largest contribution to the 
classic "no free lunch", i,e., the dilemma of social decision making.
Doing without part of the water supply is the cost explored in this 
study, which examines the great drought of the 1960s, by systematically 
identifying what the people served by the New York City water system actually 
gave up. It seeks to put dollar measures on many directly enjoyed values to 
which prices are not usually applied. Car washing, swimming pool filling, 
lawn watering, showering without a friend and confidence in government all 
represent values to people served by a water system. They are affected by a 
drought. This study goes much further in producing dollar measures of such 
values than others in the literature, yet it stops short of full coverage.
It provides a significant start, if only because most discussions of the cost 
of expanding water service deal only with the supply side and do not deal 
with demand management at all.
The measures applied are for the period of the drought studied - not
for current values, for the 1980s the dollar measures would have to be more
than doubled and some would have to be changed more than that because the 
change in the value of money (inflation) is only an average measure of shifts 
in relative value over time.
Moreover, these values are for a use reduction of only about 20 
percent. Many adjustments are possible which reduce the impact of a water 
shortage. In other words, the first 20 percent reduction is much less costly 
than the next 20 percent. Remember that last 20 percent can kill and thus 
asking "what is the total value of water" is irrelevant. Cutting the last 
increment is too costly to allow.
On November 25, 1980 the New York Times announced that the City's
supply of stored water was at 36.9 percent of capacity, the lowest since
1966. The significance of this was enhanced by the fact that fewer people 
were using more water. In the 60s 1.2 billion gallons per day were released 
and in the early 80s the rate was 1.5 billion per day. The yield in a very 
dry year, i.e., the safe yield, is now rated at 1.29 billion gallons per day. 
In the dry months since the Times article, usage has been cut to levels 
comparable with those achieved in the 1960s. Interest in water service 
capacity and particularly in ability to manage risk has prompted the release 
of this study.
Paul Merkens wrote the thesis from which this report was extracted. 
Readers will find many details of concept and method presented there.^ He 
also developed improvements in the analytical methods for balancing with­
drawals from reservoirs as a drought progresses. He estimated the value of 
metering as well as the management of groundwater in conjunction with surface 
water. Much of this was used by the Southeast New York Water Supply 
Commission, on whose staff he served under the intrepid Bob Hennigan. He 
went on to work as a consultant and as a policy analyst for the U.S.
Secretary of the Interior. He was a part of the staff of the Assistant 
Secretary for Water Resources when a stroke prematurely ended his career.
David J . A1lee 
August 31, 1981
THE NEW YORK CITY WATER SYSTEM
AND THE 1960s DROUGHT
Introductory Summary
The traditional approach to water supply planning is to make certain 
safe yield is always equal to or greater than forecasted water requirements. 
Safe yield is the minimum amount of water a system will produce in a repe- 
tition of the most severe drought of record and is a very conservative esti­
mate of supply capability. Usually no attempt is made to estimate economic 
benefits associated with supply at different levels and thus at different 
costs. This methodology has been used to develop no-risk plans for expansion 
of water supply capacity for the New York metropolitan area.
The dissertation from which this paper was excerpted developed a 
probability distribution of supply capabilities from the New York City water 
supply system. A Markov-chain, reservoir-storage-probability model which 
preserves the serial correlation of inflows simplified the supply problem by 
assuming two six-month periods per year and one large reservoir. The model 
output showed that the safe yield of the New York system would be equaled or 
exceeded 99.9 percent of the time.
Economic benefits lost in a water shortage were estimated by counting 
1osses of economic welfare to producers and consumers during the severe 
Northeast drought of the 1960s. Shortage loss functions were then developed 
for the New York area.
The shortage loss functions and probability distribution of supply were 
combined in a capacity expansion analysis which explicitly accepted risk.
The analysis determined the combi nation and timing of projects which mini­
mizes the total present value of expected annual shortage losses and the 
annual cost of projects. The analysis was constrained to 1imit the maximum 
shortage in any year to levels previously experienced and to limit the 
frequency of large shortages. By accepting risk, project timing could be 
delayed by six years, capital costs were reduced, required storage volume was 
reduced and the total present value of costs was reduced by 38 percent.
Demand management through universal metering in New York City was 
explored as a means of reducing consumption and shortage risks. A linear 
regression analysis of per capita consumption of residences directly metered, 
indicated universal metering would reduce consumption in the City by 15 
percent. With universal metering in the constrained-risk, capacity-expansion 
analysis, timing of projects is delayed by 20 years from the original no-risk 
plan, and the total present value of annual costs is reduced by 60 percent.
Thi s study demonstrates that by accepti ng some risk in public water 
supply planning, it is possible to delay requi red projects and to reduce the 
present value of costs. This allows greater flexibility and time to refine 
project plans and to develop alternative technologies.
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Responses to Water Shortages
There have been recent droughts which have caused significant water 
shortages for the New York City water supply system. The Northeast droughty 
of 1961-67 was an extremely rare and severe event. This review of the City s 
response to that shortage will indicate responses to be expected and types 
of information necessary to estimate the costs of future water supply 
shortages.
From 1961-1967, there was a severe drought which affected the New York 
City water supply system more critically than the previous one of 1949-50.
At the beginning of the dry season in June, 1961, the City reservoirs were 
full. In the next two years precipitation was 77 percent of the average and 
consequently, at the beginning of the dry season in 1963 the reservoirs had a 
void of 35 percent (Groopman 1968). By November 1, 1963, storage was down to 
26 percent of capacity, further signaling a shortage. At this time the City 
initiated a conservation campaign designed to gain voluntary cooperation. No 
mandatory restrictions were imposed.
In the Spring of 1964, runoffs into the reservoirs were near normal, 
storage was at 89 percent capacity by May 1 and the conservation campaign was 
suspended. After May, however, the drought intensified. Precipitation was 
44 percent of normal and runoff was at record low levels. With such low 
runoffs, high releases were required to maintain low-flow requirements in the 
Delaware River. In 1965, the Mayor declared a water shortage, appealed for 
voluntary cooperation and instituted restrictive measures which included (NYC 
Bureau of Water Supply 1965):
April 7, 1965 - watering of municipal parks and golf courses
restricted
- use of water for street cleaning banned
- fire hydrant harnesses installed and laws governing 
illegal hydrant openings more rigidly enforced
- water for cleaning subway cars and buses reduced.
April 19, 1965 - watering lawns and gardens curtailed
May 19, 1965 - use of City water for ornamental fountains banned
- car washings restricted
June 16, 1965 - watering lawns or gardens banned
August 5, 1965 - washing fleet vehicles with City water banned
- air conditioning limited to 12 hours a day.
These restrictions were also imposed on water utilities outside the City 
which were supplied from the City system. Survey teams inspected apartment 
buildings for plumbing which could be repaired to conserve water. An
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intensive publicity campaign through the press, radio, TV and posters was 
aimed at domestic consumers and appeals for cooperation were also addressed 
to heavy water-using industries and commercial operations such as bottling 
plants, laundries, breweries, hotels and commercial car wash establishments. 
Other than for commercial car washes and air-conditioning installations, 
however, there were no mandated restrictions on commercial or industrial 
water users. Commercial car wash establishments were required to instal1 
water-recyling equipment and a survey of air-conditioning installations was 
undertaken to determine noncompliance with recycling.
The City, moving to develop emergency supplies, petitioned the State 
to allow the ^installation of the Hudson River emergency pumping plant at 
Chelsea. Thi s pi ant started pumpi ng on March 21, 1966 and continued through 
January 13, 1967. In this period 22 bi11ion gallons (75 million gallons per 
day) was pumped from the river. The City groundwater f1eld in Long Island1s 
Nassau County had not been pumped si nee the mi d-fi fti es because of the rather 
poor water quality of this source. However, during a 12-month period in 1965 
and 1966, this well fi eld was reactivated and 6.5 bill ion gal Ions (18 MGD) 
were pumped into the City and blended with upstate water. Also, water from 
the Cannonsville Reservoir in the Delaware Basin complex was diverted to New 
York City.
Because of the record low flows in the Del aware Basin, releases 
required to maintain the Delaware streamf1ow target piaced an enormous burden 
on the City water supply system. By mid-June of 1965 it was necessary to 
release 600 MGD to maintain the target. Continued releases at such levels 
would have emptied the Delaware reservoirs by mid-August. The City, there­
fore, unilaterally reduced downstream releases to a level equal to natural 
inflows (Groopman 1968).
On July 7, 1965, the Delaware River Basin Commission declared that the 
drought constituted a state of emergency. In the interest of the City and 
the downstream states, temporary diversion rates and release requi rements 
were established. Under the temporary specification the target was reduced 
by 21 percent. New York was not permitted to store water in Cannonsville 
Reservoir unless the flow at Montague was 1200 cubic feet per second without 
releases from any storage. The modified release requirements gave an extra 
160 MGD to the City for the peri od of June, 1965 through May, 1966.
In 1967, the drought conditions ended and streamflows began to approach 
average levels. By the end of the year, normal water use again predominated 
and consumption rose to near predrought levels. On March 2, 1967, the 
Delaware River Basin Commission declared the end of the state of emergency 
and releases, as stipulated by the Court decree, were again required. On 
March 30, 1967, the Cannonsville Reservoir was full enough to be considered 
officially on line. Because of its severity, the 1960s drought has had a 
long-term effect on water-supply thinking for New York City. First, the 
severi ty of the drought caused a reevaluati on of the existi ng system. As 
stated by Abraham Groopman, the Chief Engineer of the New York City water 
supply system (1968):
The current drought has demonstrated most vividly that the
New York City system can no 1onger be depended upon duri ng
a protracted dry period to produce the quantities of water
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for which it was designed. In fact, the loss of close to 
1-1/2 years of precipitation in the past 6 years has dras­
tically reduced the yield capability of the watersheds.
Prior to this, the most severe drought of record was that of 1930.
Based on the inflows of that experience the safe yield for the New York City 
reservoir system was set at 1800 MGD, a figure used by the Supreme Court in 
allocating the water of the Delaware. Based on the drought of the sixties, 
however, the safe yield of the system was set at 1297 MGD, a reduction of 28 
percent. A1though its basis was an extremely rare event, the reduced safe 
yield is now being used to demonstrate the need for additional water supply 
projects.
Because of the apparent need, the drought of the sixties has inspired 
several studies of the metropolitan water situation. The US Congress, in the 
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1968, commissioned the Northeastern United States 
Water Supply Study. This was the first major involvement of the Federal 
government in municipal water supply planning, an activity usually undertaken 
by local and state governments. The State of New York responded to the 
apparent inadequacy of supply by establishing the Temporary State Commission 
on the Water Supply Needs of Southeastern New York. This commission deter­
mined on the basis of the sixties drought that an additional source of supply 
would be required by 1985.
Another response to the drought was an increase in the price of water 
to consumers. At the time of the 60s drought, both metered and flat rates 
in NYC were the same as in 1934. On July 1, 1966, the frontage rate was 
increased by 100 percent, and on January 1, 1971, by 75 percent. The metered 
rate was increased by 100 percent on September 1, 1968, and by 75 percent on 
August 1, 1970, to the present rate of $700 per million gallons: that is, 
after the drought, water rates were increased by a factor of 3.5 times the
original rates.
Conservation campaigns and emergency sources are the only drought 
responses now available to the City. Were Carmonsville Reservoir on line 
during the 60s drought, the City would probably have been able to meet the 
required Delaware releases and 1t is doubtful that the Delaware River Basin 
Commission would have relaxed the requirements. Therefore, with the present 
facilities it is assumed that the Delaware target will be met and that a 
reduction in releases is a less possible response for future shortages. In 
the water shortages of both 1949-50 and 1965-66, conservation campaigns were 
able to effect reductions of about 17 percent of anticipated needs. In both 
cases the reductions followed rather intensive campaigns, indicating a 
probable upper limit to such reductions prompted by water shortages.
Both the 1950s and 1960s campaigns resulted in similar reductions of 
water needs. However, the reductions came from different sectors. In 
1950, commercial and industrial users reduced water use by approximately 
20 percent. All others including municipal and residential users effected 
reductions of about 17 percent. In absolute terms, the residential users
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were responsible for most of the reduction. In 1965 and 1966, there was no 
significant reduction in water use by industrial/commercial accounts. Resi­
dential and municipal water use, on the other hand, dropped by about 18 
percent.
This difference in response between the two consumption campaigns 
follows the different emphases of the two campaigns. The 50s campaign 
included restrictions for commercial users. The most important was the 
requirement for recirculating equipment on air-conditioning instal 1 ations 
of three tons and over, a requirement made permanent after the drought. The 
only restrictions for residential and municipal uses were bans on lawn 
sprinkling, car washing and swimming pools. Recognizing that residential 
reductions had accounted for the greatest absolute drop in water use, the 
conservation campaign of the 60s was di rected essentially at municipal and 
residential users. Other than the requirement for recyling equipment in 
commercial car wash•establishments and the reduced hours of air-conditioning 
operation, no restrictions were piaced on commercial/Industrial uses.
Rather, voluntary cooperation was expected in this sector.
Municipal water use restrictions were placed on such operations as 
street cleaning, park and golf course uses, subway car washing and ornamental 
fountains. Curtailment of these municipal uses accounted for a very small 
reduction in use, but were important, for in conjunction with the educational 
campai gn, they helped promote a cri sis psychology necessary to gain the 
ful1er cooperation of residential users.
New York City's responses to the droughts are rather typical of drought 
responses in other water utility systems. According to a survey done in 
Massachusetts, a typical response to a water shortage is the introduction of 
use restrictions. This is quite often followed by emergency supplies {Russel 
et al. 1970). An interesting finding was the apparent order in which 
different sectors were restrained in their water use: if the potential
shortage facing a community was less than 10 percent, the community attempted 
to meet it by restricting residential and possibly municipal uses, and only 
when the potential shortage was significantly greater than 10 percent did 
communities move to restrain industrial use.
The hierarchy of response is even more applicable in New York City 
because industrial usage amounts to a very small portion of the City's needs. 
There is no large water-using industry in the City, although there is a 
1 arge intake by the commercial sector. The most significant commercial use 
is make-up water for air conditioning. With a permanent requirement for 
recirculating equipment in air conditioners, there is small opportunity for 
reduction in this sector.
Thus, New York Ci ty is limited in its drought response to restrictions 
on municipal uses, outside residential uses such as lawn sprinkling and car 
washing, and voluntary restraint on in-house domestic uses. The most 
important of these possible responses are voluntary reductions by apartment 
tenants and by homeowners.
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Economic Costs of the Drought
Economic loss estimates center on the costs of use restraints and
substitutes. These estimates can then be used to develop shortage loss 
functions for the New York City water supply system.
The 1oss estimates were based on a partial equilibrium rather than on a 
general equilibrium. That is, the general economy within the region was held 
constant and only the firms and consumers affected by water shortage were 
identified and analyzed. Full employment was assumed for the region and 
economic inputs used to mitigate the effects of the shortage would have been 
diverted from some other activity, thus resulting in a net loss to the 
region.
A regional accounting stance was taken and extraregional externalities 
due to the shortage responses in the New York region were ignored. This is 
reasonable if the possibility of a reduced streamflow target in the Delaware 
River is not considered viable and if there is no 1oss of industrial output 
from the region.
Economic Wei fare Accounti ng Model
There are three levels of interrelationship in the production and 
consumption of water supply: first level supplier, intermediate producers
and ultimate consumers {figure 1). The first level in this case is the New 
York City Bureau of Water Supply. This utility faced a shortage of water 
because of the drought and responded with emergency supplies (substitutes), 
curtailed output and mandated use restrictions. The utility, taken as a 
separate producing firm, had reduced producer surplus because of the costs of 
the emergency supplies and reduced revenues■ Estimating the 1oss of economic 
welfare at this first level necessitates an accounting of these costs.
The water utility supplies water to the second level of the interrela­
tionship, the intermediate producers, who are not ultimate consumers but use 
water in the production of goods consumed by others. The intermediate level 
includes industrial and commercial firms, certain municipal functions and 
water utilities outside the City supplied from the City system. During the 
drought, some of the intermediate producers reduced output, saved on their 
water costs and passed the loss of economic welfare to consumers. Others 
kept their output at the normal level but used substitutes or alternate 
technology and absorbed the 1oss of economic welfare associated with the^ 
shortage. To account for the loss of economic welfare at this level it is 
necessary to determine which producers used substitutes and absorbed the cost 
of the water shortage and which reduced output.
The third level of the interrelationship 1s the ultimate consumers. At 
this level, economic welfare is measured by consumer surplus utility. To 
account for the loss of consumer surplus, it is necessary to isolate which 
water supply goods and other goods were in short supply to consumers. Then 
the demand curve for these goods can be used to estimate the reduced consumer 
surplus.
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HYDROLOGIC
SHORTAGE
Figure 1. Water Shortage Wei fare Schematic.
Two exceptions to the use of consumer surplus must be made. These 
exceptions are for residential water in New York City and for some public 
goods. Firsts the water supplied residential consumers in New York City is 
not metered but is paid on a flat-rate formula. Nonmetered consumers pay the 
same water cost no matter how much water they actually consume. When non­
metered consumers reduce consumption below normal levels, they lose the full 
utility associated with this reduction. There is no reduction in water costs 
and no loss of revenues to the utility. The loss of economic welfare is, 
therefore, equal to the total area under the demand curve not just the con­
sumer surplus portion.
The second special case for estimating lost economic welfare is related 
to those goods having no readily defined demand curve. This includes goods 
such as air conditioning and public goods from municipal functions such as 
clean streets and ornamental fountains. A public good is defined as a good 
which can be used by one consumer without diminishing its availability to 
others. To determine the demand curve for a public good, it is necessary to 
sum the payments which various members of society are willing to contribute 
to assure its supply. Determining each individual1s true willingness to pay 
is difficult because regardless of payment size, each sti11 retains equal use 
(Baumol 1965). Lacking demand curves to defi ne consumer surplus for these 
public goods, this study will use the less precise concept of benefits. For
- 8 -
those goods in short supply from intermediate producers, it will be deter­
mined if there was a loss of benefits. For those goods in short supply from 
intermediate producers, it will be determined if there was a loss of benefits 
and their value will be measured by using the surrogate of the costs of 
ordinarily supplying the benefits.
Summary of Mel fare Losses: 1965-67 Drought
Costs in terms of lost economic welfare in NYC were estimated for the 
drought of 1965-67. The first step was to estimate the costs for the June, 
1965 thru May, 1966 period. This was the first period of drought response 
and included the most intense one-year period of shortage. The estimated 
losses of producers surplus to the water supplier and intermediate producers 
and the estimated losses of economic welfare to the ultimate consumers are 
summarized in table 1.
The 1965-66 base data was also extrapolated to include the 1965-67 
period. The water supply shortage became particularly acute in the early 
part of 1965 and the water conservation campaign was initiated in April of 
that year. The most pronounced water use reductions were achieved in the 
1965-66 period, although the campaign continued for almost a year more.
In the one-year period from June, 1966 through May, 1967, average daily 
consumption from the New York City water supply system was reduced by 123 MGD 
or 10 percent below the normally anticipated consumption level. The costs of 
these continued water reductions must be included in the total drought 
costs. Not all of the costs of the water shortage incurred in the June,
1965- May, 1966 period were repeated in the fol1owing year. The capital 
costs of developing substitute sources, installing recycling equipment or 
repairing piumbing leaks were assumed in the first period and were not 
repeated in the second. The economic costs which continued were estimated by 
prorating the losses from June, 1965 to May, 1966, assuming that consumers 
continued the same water conservation practices beyond the 1965-66 period but 
did so for less than a full year. It is estimated that the total loss of 
economic welfare amounted to $73 million (table 2). The losses of producer 
surplus amounted to $15 million, one-fifth the total, while losses of con­
sumer surplus amounted to $58 million.
Consumers in the residential sector of New York City and the upstate 
service area contributed 77 percent of the water reduction and suffered 80 
percent of the economic losses. The domestic users in New York City alone 
contributed 69 percent of the reduction and accepted 65 percent of the 
losses. Under normal conditions, domestic consumption in the City amounts to 
43 percent of the total usage from the New York City water supply system.
The commercial/industrial sector, excluding apartment buildings, generally 
uses 23 percent of the total supplied. This sector contributed less than 5 
percent to the total reduction. The New York City Bureau of Water Supply 
sustained 10.6 percent of the drought costs through the costs of emergency 
supplies and lost revenues. The upstate service area normally uses 6-7
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Table 1. New York City Water Supply System. Costs of Drought Responses to Producers and Consumers, 
June 1965 - May 1966.
Affected Activity
Reduction in 
Water Intake
Cost of Reduction 
(Net loss of 
Producer Surplus)
Water Costs 
Saved
FIRST LEVEL SUPPLY
New York City - Bureau of Water Supply^ — $6,582,000 0
Emergency Supplies — 5,100,000 --
Reduced Revenues -- 1,482,000
INTERMEDIATE PRODUCERS 40 MGD 6,666,000 --
Municipal Functions 5,000
Public Golf Courses 0.2 MGD 0
Street Cleaning 1 MGD 5,000 —
Fire Hydrants^ 5 MGD 0 —
Ornamental Fountains^ 0.5 MGD 0 —
Commercial Sector 5,316,000
Washing Subway Cars 0.05 MGD ($4,000)3 $ 44,0002
Air Conditioning 6 MGD 0 438,000
Car Wash Establishments 2.1 MGD 2,320,000 551,0002
Apartment Buildings 25 MGD 3,000,000 0
Upstate Service Area
Water Uti1iti es
Reduced Revenues 125 MGD 1,345,000 449,000
Apartment Buildings 0 327,000
CONSUMERS 175 MGD 37,973,000 --
New York City Residential Sector 162.5 MGD 36,124,000 0
Lawn Sprinkling 3.5 MGD 1,680,000 0
Car Washing 1.0 MGD 2,254,000 0
Domestic Consumption 158 MGD
Apartments 25,900,000 0
Single Family Homes 6,290,000 0
Upstate Service Area 
Residential Sector 12.5 MGD 1,813,000
Lawn Sprinkling 5 MGD 430,000 725,000
Car Washing 0.5 MGD 914,000 75,000
Domestic Consumption 7 MGD
Apartments 100,000 0
Single Family Homes 369,000 666,000
Consumption of Other Goods 128,000
Ornamental Fountains k 128,000 0
Air Conditioning * 0 0
. Public Golf Courses k 0 0
TOTAL FOR PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS 215 51,221,000
^Activities which reduced production or output.
^Present value of water costs saved over lifetime of water substitutes.
3( ) indicates cost saving.
* See text for discussion.
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Table 2. New York City Water Supply System. Total Costs of Drought Responses, 
1965-1967
Net Reduction 
in Economic
Share of 
Total
Level and Affected Activity Welfare Costs
{%)
FIRST LEVEL SUPPLY $ 7,736,000 10.6
NYC Bureau of Water Supply
Emergency Supplies 
Lost Revenues
5.700.000
2.036.000
7.8
2.8
INTERMEDIATE PRODUCERS 7,253,000 9.9
Municipal Functions 9,000 Neg.
Public Golf Courses
Street Cleaning
Illegal Fire Hydrant Openings
Ornamental Fountains
0
9,000
0
0
Neg.
0
Commercial Sector 5,316,000 7.3
Washing Subway Cars 
Air Conditioning 
Car Wash Establishments 
Apartment Buildings
($4,000)
0
2,320,000
3,000,000
0
0
3.2
4.1
Upstate Water Utilities
Lost Producer Surplus 1,928,000 2.6
CONSUMERS 58,144,000 79.5
Publi c Goods 
Ornamental Fountains 235,000 0.3
New York City Residential Sector 54,962,000 75.2
Lawn Sprinkling 
Car Washing 
Domestic Consumption 
Apartments 
Single Family Homes
3.360.000
4.131.000
47.471.000
38.195.000
9.276.000
4.6
5.7 
64.9
52.2
12.7
Upstate Service Area 2,947,000 4.0
Lawn Sprinkling 602,000 0.8
Car Washing 1,675,000 2.3
Domestic Consumption 670,000 0.9
Apartments 143,000 0.2
Single Family Homes 527,000 0.7
TOTAL FOR PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS $73,133,000 100.0
Contribution 
to Total 
Reduction
ix — r%r
28.7 23.2
4.9 4.0
0.1 0.1
0.7 0.6
3.7 3.0
0.4 0.3
23,8 19.2
Neg.
4.0 3.2
1.5 1.2
18.3 14.8
94.7 76.9
88.3 71.7
2.6 2.1
0.7 0.6
85.0 69.0
6.4 5.2
2.5 2.0
0.3 0.2
3.6 3.0
123.4 100.0
B.G. = Billion Gallons.
percent of the water supplied by the New York City water system and, 
proportionately, suffered nearly 7 percent of the lost economic welfare.
Commentary on the Cost Estimate
The very nature of nonmarket goods makes them difficult to quantify in 
an economic evaluation. In many instances, the values are intangible and 
consumers find it difficult to express what about the good gives satisfac­
tion. Where it is possible to develop an agreed-upon measure of the good, 
the measure is often not comparable with other goods and economic costs.
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Public and social goods are generally indivisible, making it difficult 
to exclude a consumer even though he or she is unable to make known the 
degree of willingness to pay. In addition, much of the value of social goods 
is involved in consumer1s option demand. That is, an individual may not 
actually consume a public good but takes satisfaction in its availability and 
in the option to use it when desired (Davidson, Adams and Seneco 1965).
This 1ack of total refinement in evaluating nonmarket goods is not a 
serious constraint to the basic purpose of this study. The economic welfare 
costs of the drought responses were estimated in order to develop water 
shortage loss functions. These were used in combination with water supply 
project costs, which, while easier to define, are also subject to variation. 
Thus, refining the value estimate of nonmarket goods may not improve the 
accuracy of the final output. Finally, a sensitivity analysis will determine 
the ful1 significance of the nonmarket goods that are imperfectly 
quantified.
Estimates of Drought Costs
The costs associated with the drought were estimated for producers 
that developed substitute sources or reduced production of goods and for 
consumers when shortages of water or other goods resulted in loss to that
sector.2/
Losses to Producers
The New York City Bureau of Water Supply - The Bureau passed on a 
shortage equal to 17 percent of normal water usage to i ntermedi ate producers 
and consumers. In addition, the Bureau developed emergency sources. Both 
responses reduced the Bureau's producer surplus. In 1965, the City reacti­
vated the Hudson River emergency pumping plant which had been inactive since 
1955. The intake and discharge 1ines were still in place, so the only ex­
pense was for pumping equipment, chlorine and alum feeds. These cost an 
estimated $4.9 million (Metcalf and Eddy 1966). The Chelsea pumping plant 
was completed and went on 1ine March 21, 1966. From that date until Jan­
uary 13, 1967, a total of 22 bill ion gallons were pumped from the Hudson with 
operation and maintenance costs of $800,000. The share of the operation and 
maintenance costs assigned to the June, 1965 through May, 1966 period was 
$190,000 for a total cost in that period of $5.1 million dollars.
The New York City Bureau of Water Supply also drew emergency water from 
the Long I si and groundwater field, in disuse si nee 1955. They drew 6.5 
bill ion gal 1ons over a 12-month period in 1965-66, at an estimated cost of 
$1,000 for the year.
The 1oss of revenues to the Bureau was due to reduced wholesale water 
sales upstate and reduced sales to the commercial sector. These totaled 
$1,482,000, including the present value of the stream of reduced revenues
2/por references and details of these calculations see Merkens, 1974.
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from the Transit Authority and commercial car washes. These two industries 
developed substitute sources of water which also reduced revenues to the 
City.
Municipal Functions - Water use restrictions were imposed on municipal 
golf courses and parks, street-flushing operations and ornamental fountains 
(NYC Parks, Recreation, and Cultural Affairs Administration). In addition, 
there was increased emphasis on preventing illegal fire hydrant openings. In 
New York City, all municipal operations are exempt from water use charges. 
Thus, there was no reduction of water costs for those services which reduced 
consumption.
There are 13 municipally owned golf courses and numerous parks in the 
City. In a normal year approximately 63 million gallons of water from 
municipal sources is used to maintain the golf courses. During the drought, 
this use was curtailed and annual consumption was reduced by 20 million 
gallons. Water use was not banned altogether in order to protect the City's 
substantial investment in its golf courses. Watering of greens was 
continued. Trees and fairways were reconditioned after the drought through 
normal maintenance operations and there were no extraordinary expenses for 
repair.
The lawns in the City-owned parks are dependent on rain and were thus 
unaffected by water use restraints. Formalized areas in the parks including 
shrub beds and ornamental trees and gardens are in some cases irrigated with 
City water. When sprinkling water was banned, these areas were watered from 
trucks. There were negligible cost increases associated with this mainte­
nance procedure.
Prior to the drought of the 1950s, City water from free-flowing 
hydrants was used for street f1ushing and snow removal. This use amounted to 
20 MGD (WPA). After that drought, the prohibitions on such water uses were 
continued. Presently, only water from trucks and other street-cleaning 
equipment may be used for street-cleaning operations. The City's Department 
of Sanitation has 50 trucks which each use approximately 15,000 gallons per 
day for street cleaning. During the drought of the sixties, use of City 
water was again banned for street-cleaning operations. River water was 
substituted and was heavily chlorinated. This substitute water and the 
chlorination requirement caused some corrosion of equipment and a figure of 
$100 per truck was assigned as a cost. There were no effects on the sewer 
system from the brackish river water because of the high dilution of the 
relatively small amount used (NYC Dept, of Sanitation).
The City issues fire hydrant caps which can be used to spray water for 
recreational purposes. In addition, children often illegally open the 
hydrants on their own using considerably more water than with the caps. 
During the drought, the use of the caps was continued but illegal fire 
hydrant openings were curtailed. On very hot days, it has been estimated 
that as much as 500 MGD are lost through free-flowing hydrants. The 
Engineering Panel on Water Supply (1951) estimated that 5 MGD on an annual 
average was saved during the drought of 1949-50 through surveillance for 
illegal hydrant openings, and this figure was assumed for this study. No 
direct cost was associated with this curtailment; it was part of the general 
public cooperation.
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During the sixties drought, water for ornamental fountains was banned, 
saving an estimated 0.5 MGD. There was no reduction in water costs because 
the fountains, as a municipal function, were exempt from water costs. The 
1oss of economic welfare associated with the fountai ns was passed to con­
sumers.
Commercial Sector - The industrial use of publicly supplied water in 
New York City is minor and was not restricted during the drought. There 
were, however, minor restraints on the commercial sector. Air-conditioning 
operators reduced production, and other restrained activities in the 
commercial sector used water substitutes which affected their producer 
surplus.
The New York City Transit Authority uses about 50,000 gal Ions per day 
to wash its subway cars. During the drought, this use of City water was 
restricted and the Authority developed substitute sources for its five main­
tenance centers. Five wells of 100 gal 1ons per minute capacity were drilied 
at an approximate cost of $5,000 per wel1, with an annual operating cost of 
$250 each. Assuming a forty-year 1ife for wells and an eight percent 
discount rate, the present worth of the cost of the wel1s is $40,000.
Using Ci ty water at a cost of 20$ per 1,000 gal 1ons would cost the 
Transit Authority $3,650 each year. This has a present worth, over 40 years 
at eight percent, of $44,000. Therefore, in using wells to supply water, 
there was actually a net savings in terms of present worth of $4,000 (New 
York City Transit Authority).
There are a total of 1.2 million tons of water-cooled air conditioning 
in New York City. In 1965, 85 percent of this tonnage recycled cooling water 
and used an annual average of 22 MGD for makeup water. The remai ning non- 
recycli ng uni ts used an annual average of 49 MGD. Duri ng the drought, all 
uni ts were limited to 12 hours a day of operation and those uni ts not 
recycling were 1imited to the amount of water they would have used if they 
recycled.
The effect of the 12-hour limit was a reduction in water use of 6 MGD, 
annually. This reduced water costs to producers by $438,000 and translated 
into reduced revenues to the Bureau of Water Supply. The loss of economic 
welfare was passed to consumers of air-conditioning benefits. About 15 
percent of the tonnage was not recycled. These were small uni ts with an 
average capacity of 4 tons. Through the drought campaign, the City was able 
to gain compliance from 70 percent of these smal1 units. Although the 
sixties drought promoted greater compliance of the restriction carried 
through from the drought of the fifties, the cost of compliance should be 
charged against the fifties drought, since equipment was not 1nstal1ed and 
operating until the summer of 1967 when the shortage was considered past.
If 70 percent of the tonnage not recycling cooling water were to 
install recycling equipment, there would be a reduction in water use of 32 
MGD, annually. The average water use for industrial/commercial purposes was 
282 MGD for the years of 1960-66. Only in 1967 did i ndustri al/commerci al 
consumption drop to 253 MGD, apparently accounted for by the installation of 
recycling equipment.
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In 1965, 145 of the estimated 160 commercial car wash establishments in 
New York City used 2.1 MGD of City water. During the drought, the City 
required car washes to either install recycling equipment or reduce their 
water intake by 50 percent. Recycling equipment costs an average of $10,000 
and reduces water used per car from 100 down to 50 gal 1ons. The annual cost 
with recycling equipment would be:
Depreciation {Straight line, 5 years) —  $2,000 
Operation and Maintenance 500 
Annual Water Costs 50
Total annual costs $2,550
These annual costs, combined with the initial capital investment would have a 
present worth of $20,000 {8 percent over 5 years).
Without recycling equipment the annual cost for water would be $1000 
for the average car wash. With a five-year stream and a discount rate of 8
percent, this would have a present worth of $4000. Thus, the net cost of
recyling equipment in terms of present worth would be $16,000 for the average 
car wash. For those supplied by New York City, this represents a loss of 
producers surplus of $2,320,000 for their use of water substitutes. There 
would be a loss of water revenues to the City of $138,000 per year with a 
present worth of $551,000.
In New York City, assuming recycling equipment, the cost for water 
accounts for between 3 and 4 percent of variable costs. Fixed costs would be 
increased by about 4 percent. The average capital investment for a new car 
wash would be about $200,000 without and $210,000 with recycling equipment. 
Labor cost would continue to be the largest share of costs. The estimates 
assumed 100 percent compliance and are thus probably high.
It is assumed that apartment building owners and managers cooperated
with the drought campaign by repairing leaky fixtures and plumbing at a total 
estimated cost of $3,000,000. Because apartment buildings are unmetered, 
there was no reduction in water costs so the owners had a $3,000,000 reduc- 
tion in producer surplus. A survey done in New york City in 1947 found 9,142 
leaks in 2,832 dwelling units for an estimated waste of 2,237 gallons per 
day. This extrapolates to a total waste inside residential buildings of 200 
MGD (Beame 1959). During the drought of 1949-50, many repairs were made and 
waste dropped to an estimated 100 MGD (D'Angelo 1964).
In 1965, Fire Department teams inspected 69,500 dwel1ings and found 
200,000 breaks or 3 leaks per building {Pitometer Associates 1968). With 
the same 1ncidence of leaks as in the 1947 sample, it is probable that 
waste inside buildings was as high as 200 MGD. In extrapolating the 1965 
Fire Department sample, there would have been as many as 1,500,000 leaky 
fixtures or plumbing leaks in the City in 1965. It is assumed that the 
drought campaign inspired the repair of one-third of these leaks at a cost 
of $6.00 each. The total cost of the repairs would have been $3,000,000 and 
water intake would have been reduced by 25-50 MGD. Although the tenants in 
apartment buildings reduced consumption an estimated 30 percent, there was no 
reduction in water costs to apartment owners, as they pay a fixed rate for 
service.
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Upstate Service Area - New York City does not retail water to consumers 
in the upstate service area. Rather, the City wholesales to other utilities 
who then retai1 the water. On the basis of predrought records, it is esti­
mated that the upstate service area would have used 80 MGD in 1965. Because 
of the drought the utilities actually supplied 68 MGD. The reduced demand 
1owered their water revenues by $1,794,000. However, their wholesale water 
costs were concurrently reduced by $449,000, 1eaving a net 1oss of producer 
surplus of $1,345,000. Tenants in upstate apartment buildings reduced water 
consumpti on an estimated 17 percent, resulti ng in a reduction of costs to 
apartment owners of $327,000.
Losses to Consumers
During the drought, consumers faced shortages in water supply as well 
as the supply of goods from some i ntermediate producers. There were 
reductions or diminished quality in the supply of fire hydrant openings, 
ornamental fountains, air conditioning and public golf courses.
Lawn sprinkling - New York City's lawn watering is limited to the 
Boroughs of Richmond and Queens, the only areas having a high percentage of 
single-family dwelling units with lawns to be watered. It was necessary to 
impute a demand functi on for 1 awn wateri ng, and the demand curve derived by 
Howe and Linaweaver (1967) was assumed. The willingness to pay for the water 
not used was taken as the consumer uti1ity 1ost by the ban on sprinkling.
The willingness to pay, V^, is the area under the demand curve 
P = f(Q) shown by the integral:
q 2
V. = Pdq
Ql
where Qi and Q2 are points on the demand curve. For this study, Q2 is 
the household water use including sprinkling and Qi is household use 
without sprinkling.
If the price elasticity of demand, E, is a constant between Qi and 
Q2 and if a point on the demand curve can be specified (Pp, Qp) then 
the above integral can be expressed as
Vt
Pb %
1/E
1 ”T
(Young & Gray 1972)
Estimates of Pp, Q^, and E were taken from Howe and Li naweaver. 
Accordi ng to their study, the average price for water in the eastern Uni ted 
States is 40 cents per 1000 gallons. At this price an urban household uses 
80 gal 1ons per day per dwel1ing unit (gpud) for lawn sprinkling during the
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summer season (90 days). These two pieces of Information are taken as P5 
and Qb«
The price elasticity of demand for sprinkling water in the East was 
“1.6 according to Howe and Linaweaver. They also derived an elasticity of 
demand for the nation as a whole equal to -1.1. The less elastic measure 
of demand was used in this study for several reasons. First, the lawns in 
Richmond and Queens are rather small and do not require much water. The 
small amount used will be less sensitive to price than will a large demand. 
Seconds in the drought of the 1960s there was very little precipitation and 
without sprinkling water households were concerned not just with greenness 
but with the possibility of permanent lawn damage. In other words, the 
drought situation in the East was analogous to normal conditions in the West. 
The demand for sprinkling water in the West is inelastic and when included in 
the national average, makes the national elasticity of demand inelastic.
In Richmond Qji = 270 gpud and Qg = 350 gpud. This yields a will- 
ingness to pay for sprinkling water of 11 cents a day per household or 
$445,500 per sprinkling season of 90 days for the 45,000 single-family 
dwellings in Richmond.
In the borough of Queens, Qj_ was 260 gpud and Qg was 340 gpud.
This gave a consumer utility for sprinkling water of 10.7 cents per day or 
$1,233,000 per season for the 128,000 single-family homes in Queens. Hot all 
the single-family homes in Queens were included in this estimate because 30 
percent of the borough was. served by a private water company which did not 
impose water use restrictions during the drought.
Car Washing - In 1965 an estimated 1,220,000 of the 1,340,000 private 
cars in Hew York City were owned by people in areas supplied by the City 
Water Supply (Census of Housing). Assuming an average of 10 washes each 
year, there would be 12.2 million car washings. Commercial car washes 
accounted for 7.6 million so there would be a potential of 4.6 million 
private car washings in 1965. During the drought, these were banned.
A surrogate for the consumer surplus from a private car washing is 
estimated to be 49 cents. This was estimated as follows:
Total utility of a clean car 
(surrogate from commercial car washes
$1.00
Costs of a private car wash 
(from National Car Wash Council)
water 
detergent 
heating the water 
1 abor
Cents 
T 7T
2A
2A
43.9
Consumer Surplus
Total $ *51 
$ .49
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This consumer surplus lost because of the ban on car washing represents 
a total of $2,254,000 for New York City. It takes about 80 gal Ions of water 
to wash a car so approximately 1 MGD was saved through the car wash ban.
Domestic consumption - This is water used inside residences for 
cooking, drinking, laundering and personal hygiene. Duri ng the drought, 
domestic consumers in New York City reduced consumption by 158 MGD or 30 
percent below the normal level of 525 MGD. The resulting reduction in con­
sumer utility amounted to $25,900,000 for apartment dwellers and $6,290,000 
for single-family homeowners. This represents the full willingness to pay 
as there were no water costs saved by the nonmetered domestic consumers 
(table 3).
Table 3. Lost Consumer Surplus, New York City and Upstate New York Apartments and 
Single-Family Homes, 1965-66.
New York City 
Lost Consumer Surplus
Upstate New York 
Lost Consumer Surplus
Apartments
Single-family
Units Apartments
Single-family
Homes
Number of Units 2,541,173 346,426 71,200 91,300
Market Value (avg.) $12,400 $27,300 $15,200 $40,700
Occupants {avq. no.) 2.6 3.3 2.6 3.5
Water Use (qpd) 171 260 183 295
Total Use (MOD) 435 90 13 27
Drought Reduction (%) 30 30 17 17
Price per 1000 qal. $ 0.40 $ 0.40 $ 0.40 $ 0.40
Lost Consumer Surplus 
(4/uni t/day)
3.07 5.41 1.618 1.106
(3.106)
Total Annual Loss 
($ million) 25.9 6.3 1.0 0.369
Reduced Water Cost 
{if/unit/day) 1.24 2.00
Total Reduced Costs 
(S thousand) 327,0 666.0
Upstate Consumer Losses
In addition to supplying the City, the Bureau of Water Supply also 
wholesales water to the upstate counties of U1ster, Orange, Putnam and West­
chester. In 1965, an estimated 628,000 upstate people were supplied 72.2 MGD 
from the New York City system. Most of this water (94 percent) went to West­
chester County which was used as the data base to estimate the economic costs 
of the drought in the upstate service area. Water use in the county is pre­
dominantly for residential purposes. Industrial and commercial water use is 
only about 10 percent of the total supplied.
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For metered service areas on public sewers* such as Westchester County* 
the demand function for lawn sprinkling water is (Howe & Linaweaver 1967):
q = C(W - 0.6r )2-07 P'1,12 V0-662
where qs = average summer sprinkling demand in gpud
C - constant to fit the function to a specific area 
Ps = water cost (cents/1000 gal)
V = market value of the dwelling unit
rs ~ inches of precipitation for June, July and August, and
Ws = i nches of potential evapotranspi rati on for June, July and 
August estimated by the method of Thornthwaite and Mather. 
For Westchester County Ps = 40, and V - $40,700. The 
constant C is 6.79.
According to this, in the summer of 1965 the demand for sprinkling 
water would normally have been 317 gpud or 28.9 MGD for the upstate service 
area. This defines the demand function
Pw - 6854q
-0.893
s
In 1965, the actual sprinkling use was 96 gpud or 8.8 MGD. The willingness 
to pay for the water use foregone is estimated at 14.1 cents per day per 
dwel1ing unit. The loss of consumer surplus was 5.2 cents per day per 
dwelling unit and the reduction in water costs was 8.8 cents a day. The 
reduction in the cost of water to consumers was absorbed by the water 
utilities as a loss of revenues.
In Westchester County in 1965 there were an estimated 221,000 cars 
which were washed an average of 10 times each year. The ten commercial car 
washes in the county accounted for 345,000 car washings. (There were no 
restrictions on water use by commercial car washes in upstate counties. This 
leaves a potential of 1,856,010 private car washings which were banned. The 
lost consumer surplus is estimated at $914,000. The reduction in water use 
of 1.5 MGD resulted in reduced cost to consumers or a loss of revenues to the 
water utilities of $75,000.
During the drought, the domestic consumption in the City-supplied 
upstate service area was reduced by 7 MGD or 17 percent. This resulted in a 
loss of consumer surplus of $100,000 for apartment dwellers and $369,000 for 
private homeowners. There was a saving in water costs to private homeowners 
of $666,000.
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Other Goods in Short Supply
Fire-Hydrants - Although illegal fire hydrant openings were curtailed 
during the drought, hydrant spray caps were still available. Therefore, 
there was no loss of public good.
Ornamental Fountains - The loss of benefits associated with dry 
ornamental fountains is difficult to measure. The utility of a fountain 
is aesthetic and a function of fountain design and the number of people who 
draw pleasure from it each day, parameters not easily measured. The minimum 
benefit of water used for an ornamental fountain would be the cost of supply- 
ing that water. The meter rate for water in Mew York City was $700 per 
mil lion gal 1ons. This yields a minimum value of $350 a day or $128,000 a 
year for the water used in ornamental fountains, and is the assumed surrogate 
for the loss of benefits associated with the ban on water for the fountains.
Air Conditioning - There was a reduction in the air-conditioning good, 
although no significant loss of comfort. For ambient temperatures below 
95°F, the systems are overdesigned and wi11 provide adequate comfort even if 
limited to 12 hours a day of operation. The average temperature for the 
summer of 1965 was about 2°F below normal and only one day exceeded 95°F.
El ectrical shortages on extremely hot days have a more pronounced effect on 
ai r-conditioni ng efficiency than water use limits.
Public Golf Courses - During the drought, the use of water for sprin- 
kling municipal golf courses was curtailed and consequently the greens and 
fairways became browned. This diminished quality but did not reduce the 
supply of the golf course good. In an average year, about 900,000 golfers 
use municipal courses. During the drought in 1965, the number of golfers was 
about 892,000. Thus, the poorer quality did not appear to have affected 
benefits.
Unaccounted Costs
There were several drought responses for which no cost estimates were 
made. These were the public education campaign and the reduced flows in the 
Delaware River. The success of the conservation campaign on residential 
consumption was a result of the intense public education effort of the city. 
Leaflets were distributed to consumers, and the press, radio and television 
were enlisted to publicize the crisis. With the exception of the leaflets, 
however, there was no incremental cost to the mass media for broadcasting the 
drought story. They would have had the same costs for broadcasting news, 
whether or not the water shortage was included. Therefore, there is no cost 
assigned to the public education campaign. Certain water uses were curtailed 
not only to save water but also to help promote the idea of crisis. These 
were highly visible uses such as ornamental fountains and watering golf 
courses.
One of the responses made to the drought of the sixties was a temporary 
reduction in downstream releases to the Delaware River. No attempt has been 
made to estimate any economic losses related to the lower streamflows. How­
ever, there were no significant economic costs which could be directiy
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assigned to the low streamflow. There were two extensive fishkills in the 
1ower Pel aware River in mid-May of 1965 due to the depressed levels of dis­
solved oxygen. This was, however, apparently an isolated occurrence. The 
low streamflows allowed the saltwater wedge of the Delaware estuary to move 
seriously close to the Philadelphia water intake- But the chloride content 
at that'point remained within water supply standards of the US Public Health 
Service- These drought experiences indicate that conditions approached 
significant losses either to fish life or to the water supply of Philadelphia 
and demonstrate the need for the downstream releases from the Hew York City 
reservoirs.
Other costs not measured are even more elusive. They include the 
psychic value to community members gained when they have helped alleviate 
a crisis or the psychological unrest when a basic human need is in short 
supply. These and other such costs are important to the welfare of indi­
viduals and no doubt influence decision makers, although they are beyond the 
scope of this study.
Summary and Implications
Many formally organized activities are directed toward avoiding risk 
and gaining at least the appearance of certainty and security. Such activi­
ties as the national defense establishment, social security, insurance 
companies and pension funds account for a large percentage of our productive 
capabilities. They are efforts to establish a minimum framework of certainty 
and represent a desire to cope with an uncertain and a rapidly changing 
world. Only infrequently, however, is any attempt made to measure how much 
is sacrificed to gain the security these efforts attempt to guarantee.
Attempts to gain certainty and avoid risk are also evidenced in water 
resources planning. Such concepts as safety factors in design, the maximum 
probable precipitation in flood control studies and safe yield in water 
supply planning are common practices to cope with uncertainty.
This particular study has made an effort to more closely analyze risk 
aversion in public water supply. The intention has been to disclose the 
economic implications of a water supply policy tightly constrained by risk 
aversion. It is felt that the singular policy of risk aversion has resulted 
in water supply plans for New York City with insurance premiums which are out 
of proportion to the possible costs of natural catastrophies. The study, by 
actually estimating the economic costs and probabilities of a water supply 
crisis in New York City, offers an alternative policy which gives a closer 
balance between the costs of avoiding risk and the costs suffered if a water 
supply shortage occurs. This alternate policy, while it does require risk 
acceptance, does not completely ignore risk aversion. The probability of an 
inordinately severe water supply crisis in New York City is still avoided.
The amount of water naturally available for water supply varies over a 
considerable range from year to year and season to season. Storage facili­
ties reduce some of the variation but transpose the remaining variation into
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uncertainty about supply from the storage system. One approach for coping 
with this range is to ignore the possible variation and to concentrate on the 
minimum amount the system would yield under the worst of natural hydrological 
conditions. This leads to the current definition of safe yield which is the 
maximum defendable quantity of water which could be produced by a system with 
a repetition of the severest drought of record.
While this definition gives adequate information for pianning and 
management, it gives rather incomplete information. It only tells how much 
water is available under the worst conditions. It does not tell how much 
water may be available 99 percent of the time.
Information is available about how much water can be expected from the 
New York reservoir system al1 of the time, not just one percent of the time. 
This information can be displayed as a probability distribution of supply and 
gives the percentage of time a given level of supply will be equaled or 
exceeded. One probability analysis indicated, for example, that the New York 
City reservoir system will supply the safe yield or more 99.9 percent of the 
time (see Merkens 1974).
Information other than about natural hydrology and storage-yield rela­
tionships is required for water supply planning. Much of this must be esti­
mated or assumed: the populations to be served, the amount of water^they
will consume, and the benefits associated with that consumption. This 
study went well beyond previous studies and estimated the level of benefits 
associated with given consumption levels, present or forecast.
It is very difficult to measure the economic benefits flowing from a 
given level of water usage. There are many singular and interrelated uses 
for public water supply and many secondary benefits. This study has avoided 
the definition of fixed requirements and has developed information about 
water supply benefits. No attempt was made to measure the total of water 
supply benefits. Only those lost during a water supply shortage were 
i dentified and estimated.
By avoiding the use of inviolable requirements and using benefits 
instead, a study can explicitly allow for water supply shortages which will 
shrink consumption and benefits. There are several facts which suggest that 
the normal 1evel of consumption and benefi ts can be reduced, at least on 
occasion. The most basic is that New York City and other water supply^ 
systems have experienced water supply shortages with consequences consider­
ably less than catastrophic.
A second fact which allows shortages recognizes the many uses of water 
supply. Some, such as fire fighting must be supplied without question.
Others are normally inefficient, have avail able substitutes for public water 
or can be sacrificed for short periods. Previous research has given esti­
mates of demand curves for some uses of public water supply. The estimated 
elasticities of demand indicate that these uses are not totally inelastic; 
their consumption level can be contracted in response to price or to 
shortage.
Using an accounting methodology, it was estimated that the cost of the 
drought (1oss of benefi ts) in the June, 1965 through May, 1967 drought period
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in the New York metropolitan area was $73 million. Of this, 10 percent was 
absorbed by the Bureau of Water Supply, 10 percent by the intermediate 
producers and 80 percent by residential consumers. The cost for the drought 
for the one year duration, June, 1965 through Hay, 1966, was $51 million. 
This loss of benefits may seem costly, but in comparison to the cost of 
proposed projects to avoid future losses, it is not great.
Risk Acceptance!/
With the greater information made available about the supply capabili­
ties from the New York City reservoir system and the loss of benefits result­
ing from a water shortage, it is possible to devel op a pi an which accepts 
risk. Such a plan is important of itself and to make known the economic_ 
implications of risk aversion. The intenti on in developi ng such a pi an is to 
demonstrate that by accepting some risk, it is possible to delay the required 
timing of projects and reduce the present worth of project costs.
Merkens, for example, developed a capacity expansion model which allows 
for water supply shortages for the New York metropolitan area. This model 
sought to find the project timing which minimizes the total present value of 
annual project costs and expected annual shortage costs. Each year a given 
project is delayed, the present worth of annual project costs is reduced. 
However, each year the consumption levels increase with a given level of 
supply, the expected costs of water shortage are increased. The expected 
loss of benefits in any given year, T, is ET (LT ) which is approximated 
by
98
Et(lt> = £  Prob (sT < ST < sT + 2) • LT(sT + 1)
where sj is a shortage of s percent, and Lj (sj + 1) is the loss of 
benefits or the costs of a shortage of between s and s + 2 percent. Prob 
(sT < ST < s-r + 2) is the probability of a shortage of between Sj and sT + 2 
percent'wtth- the existing facilities. This information comes fr6m the
probability distribution of supply for the New York City reservoir system.
The timing which resulted from the initial capacity expansion analysis 
was found unacceptable. The magnitude of a possible shortage in some years 
was greater than the shortage experienced in the sixties drought._ Moreover, 
the frequency of possible shortages was unacceptable. The resulting solu­
tion gave a proper balance between expected drought 1osses and project 
costs. However, because the costs of projects to expand the New York City 
system are so great, the expected losses, the associated probability of 
shortages and the possible magnitude of shortages were great.
Therefore, two constraints were introduced. One limited the maximum 
percent shortage which can occur to about 20 percent or the level of shortage 
experienced in the 1965-66 drought. The second limited the frequency of
i/see also P. W. Merkens, "Risk Acceptance," pp. 149-76.
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large shortages by constraining the probability of a shortage greater than 
1.5 percent to 0.1 in any year. This constraint was designed to give assur­
ances to system managers. The constraint gives 90 percent reliability that 
no shortage greater than 1.5 percent of normal consumption will occur in any 
year.
The results with the two added constraints showed that the required 
timing of the first project in the risk-acceptance plan is 1991, versus 1985 
for the no-risk policy. More importantly, the long-range pi an based on risk 
acceptance does not require as much reservoir storage capacity. The total 
present value of expected shortage costs and annual project costs in the 
risk acceptance pi an is $196 million and the capi tal costs, $885 mill ion.
The no-ri sk pi an has a present value of project costs of $314 million and 
capital costs of $1.1 billion.
Demand Management and Universal Metering!./
In public water supply, the most significant approach to reducing risk 
is demand management. Metering is essential for any form of rational pricing 
arrangement and to properly allocate the costs of water supply. In New York 
City, only the industrial and commercial accounts or 25 percent of the water 
supplied is metered. The rest of the accounts pay ona flat-rate basis.
This situation exists even though universal metering in New York continues to 
be recommended by many studies by both state and federal agencies.
The City has apparently felt that the large number of apartment 
dwel1ers who would not be metered directly would make metering only margin­
ally effective in redueing consumption. However, Merkens demonstrated that 
metering would be effective and that other 1arge cities with universal meter- 
ing have considerably lower consumption per capita. Also water waste in 
bui1dings and 1eakage from distribution 1ines would be detectable with 
metering.
Uni versal meteri ng in New York City would reduce total consumption by 
15 percent. This was determined from a 1inear regression analysis which 
related per capita consumption of water to the percent of residential 
consumers di rectiy metered. Thi s regression gave a high degree of stati s- 
tical significance to the reductions possible.
The consumption 1evels forecast for the New York metropolitan area were 
adjusted to reflect the assumed effect of universal metering. The capacity 
expansion model was then rerun with some adjustments in the shortage loss 
functions. It was found that the loss of benefits from a given shortage were 
greater when metering was assumed. Thi s is to be expected as meteri ng 
reduces the inefficient uses of water which can be easily abated in response 
to a shortage.
The resulti ng capacity expansion plan with meteri ng included the same 
combi nation of projects as the ri sk-acceptance, no-meteri ng plan. However, 
the timing of the first project is delayed from 1991 until 2006. The total 
present value of the risk-acceptance meteri ng plan, project costs, meteri ng
1/See also P. W. Merkens, "Risk Acceptance," pp. 177-221.
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costs and expected shortage losses is $128 million. This compares with $196 
million for the risk, no-metering plan and with $314 million for the no-risk,
no-metering plan.
In order to determine which of the assumed parameters has the greatest 
effect on the capacity expansion plan with metering, a sensitivity analysis 
was performed. This showed that a 10-percent increase in forecast consump­
tion would require the first project by 1995. This is sti11 10 years later 
than the no-risk, no-metering pi an. It was also found that the analysi s is 
not particularly sensitive to the shortage loss functions derived from the 
estimated costs of the 1965-66 drought. A 10-percent increase in the short­
age costs would not change the timing of required projects and the total 
present value would only be increased by 1.1 percent.
Cone!usions
The obvious conclusion which can be drawn from this study is that a 
plan which accepts risk del ays the required timing of projects without 
incurring unacceptable losses. This reduces the urgency often associated 
with water supply in New York City. Further imp!ications of risk acceptance 
are displayed in the foil owing table:
Table 4. Summary of Risk Policy Costs and Water Project 
Timing With and Without Metering, New York City.
Risk/Metering Policy
Timing 
First 
Project
Present 
Value of 
Costs!/
Annual 
Premiums 
No-Risk
($ Million)
Averse/No meteri ng 1985 314 9.7
Averse/Metering 1985 316 15.5
Accept/No metering 1991 196 -
Accept/Metering 2006 128 -
i/lncludes present value of water projects and present 
value of expected shortage costs.
The annual premiums of the risk-aversion policy attempt to display the 
economic implications of risk aversion in one number. The difference in 
present value between the no-risk and risk-acceptance policies is viewed as 
the implied premium that risk averters are willing to pay to avoid shortages. 
This difference was spread out over the planning horizon through the use of 
equivalent annual costs to determine the annual premiums.
With the risk-acceptance, no-metering policy, the maximum possible 
annual shortage losses are $73 million. In other words, the risk aversion 
policy (no metering) requires annual premiums of about $10 million for a 
46-year period to avoid a maximum possible damage in any year of $73 million.
- 25 -
Comparing the risk-aversion and risk-acceptance policies which include meter­
ing, the implled annual premiums are nearly $16 mill ion to avoid a maximum 
possible damage in any year of $83 million.
When it is realized that the New York City water supply system serves 
more than 8 million people, a $16 million annual premium does not appear sig­
nificant, amounting to less than $2 per person per year. Yet, the loss of 
consumer benefits for a one-year period during the sixties drought (a very 
rare event) was only about $5.10 per person.
The ri sk-acceptance metering policy has a total present value 60 per­
cent 1 ess than the risk-aversion metering policy. In terms of benefit cost 
analysis, it is difficult to justify the risk-aversion policy. A policy 
which explicitly recognizes and accepts risk has greater economic efficiency 
because it makes extended use of the existing facilities. A risk-acceptance 
policy del ays new projects and al1ows the probability of shortages to in­
crease, but also i ncreases the percent of time an exi sti ng level of develop­
ment wi11 be used at near its hydrologic capacity.
The ri sk-acceptance policy developed does not obviate the need for 
further water supply investments in the New York area. It does, however, 
delay the required timing of projects, makes more efficient use of existing 
facilities and reduces the present value of project costs. By delaying the 
required timing of projects, new options are opened to planners and 
managers.
The greater time avail able can be used to refine the elements of imper­
fect information, particularly information about water consumption forecasts 
and benefits. It also gives further time for the advancement of water supply 
technology. Presently, there are some emerging technologies such as waste 
water recycling which are on the threshold of becoming technically and eco­
nomically practical.
The delay in project timing and requi red fixed investments wi11 avoid a 
self-fulfilling prophecy. The National Water Commission has stated that 
there is no inexorable reason why per capita water consumption should con­
tinue to rise. Yet, historical consumption patterns in New York City exhibit 
a fairly constant increase in consumption even though population levels in 
the City have stabilized. Much of this increase is no doubt due to economic 
improvement and growth.
Yet, there remains the possibility that assured levels of supply have 
contributed to increased consumption. New York City does not have a formal 
distribution-leak detection program and cannot do a thorough job of leak 
detection without universal metering. Seventy-five percent of the water 
delivered to the City is paid for on a flat-rate basis. The price of water 
service in the City remained the same for thirty years until the mid-sixties 
drought. The City has resisted universal metering since 1860. All of these 
factors betray a management orientation which relies on continued levels of 
assured supply. A ri sk-acceptance policy which explicitly fixes the level of 
supply should inspire a serious reevaluation of this orientation.
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Requirements of a Risk-Acceptance Policy
If a policy of risk acceptance in public water supply is to be imple­
mented, some planning and management changes will have to be made. These 
changes will make risk acceptance more palatable and limit the risk to adver- 
tised levels.
Criticism should be expected in any future shortage. A risk-acceptance 
policy will not be viable if limited criticism forces premature construction 
of projects. Managers should be able to understand criticism and write it 
off as another cost of a shortage. Criticisms from a shortage could be 
minimized through public education. The probabi1ity of shortages should be 
made known along with information about the possible magnitude and the 
required shortage responses. The economic and efficiency advantages and the 
allowed delay in projects should be advertised.
The concept of rigid requirements might well be relaxed and replaced 
with the concept of consumer benefits. Managers should view public water 
supply as an industry which supplies many goods, some rather basic and some 
not totally inelastic. It is easier to accept the possibility of a shortage 
if it is seen as a temporary sacri fice in benefi ts rather than an inabil ity 
to meet requirements. The potential of universal metering to this end has 
already been demonstrated. Leak detection programs and pricing directed 
toward demand management would further improve efficiency and reduce risk. 
Drought forecasting could be used to signal when further conservation 
measures are warranted. In other words, the risk policy being advocated 
should include action to make risk acceptable, not inevitable.
The process of project imp!ementation must be streamlined to make ri sk 
acceptance viable. 11 has been argued that the apparently i nev i tabl e del ays 
in project construction are really a form of risk policy. However, this is 
not an explicit pattern of risk acceptance. There is no true programming 
for risk, the probabilities of shortage are unknown and required shortage 
responses have not been developed. Rather, when faced with delay there is a 
real temptation to propose oversized projects to be sure they are adequate 
when final ly avail able.
The essence of a risk-acceptance plan is a series of measured responses 
to keep risk within certain limits. The responses must be available when 
planned. This requires a reduction in the expected time lag for project 
implementation.
Risk acceptance and the associated implications will be better appre­
ciated if water supply pianners and managers expand their perceived sphere of 
influence and responsibility. The region affected by water supply facilities 
is not just the supply service area, it 1ncludes the source and potential 
source areas. In this greater region there are many valid uses for water and 
other natural resources. Water supply should be taken as a high priority but 
not preemptive use. Ri sk acceptance is a trend in thi s direction.
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The required investments for public water supply are allocated from a 
fixed public budget. A matrix of other public functions must also be 
financed from this budget. A recognition and understanding of the total 
demands made on the fixed budget will promote the possibility of delaying 
water supply investments.
Water supply pianners and managers should also expand their sphere of 
responsibility to foster relations with ecology and conservation groups.
There is a growing suspicion in society that unfettered development may not 
be the most sensible avenue to continued well-being. A public investment 
policy which includes conservation measures such as metering and which del ays 
major developments through risk acceptance will be consistent with this 
thinking.
More importantly, a policy which delays development will give needed 
time for the discussion of possible alternative futures. A public decision 
for risk acceptance which recognizes, al1ows and solicits possibilities is to
be encouraged.
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